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Abstract 
 
The paper argues that the ongoing success of agricultural cooperatives in the Netherlands can be 
explained by the combination of five factors. First, the Netherlands has an enabling cooperative 
legislation. Second, cooperatives in the Netherlands have been able to maintain effective member 
control through innovations in internal governance. Third, membership heterogeneity has been kept 
low, despite growth and internationalization of agricultural cooperatives. Fourth, Dutch cooperatives 
have been pragmatic in establishing and dismantling federative cooperative structures. Fifth, 
cooperatives have chosen explicit strategies as to their position in the food chain. This paper is based 
on a review of academic and professional literature. The insights from the experiences of Dutch 
agricultural cooperatives may inspire cooperative leaders in other countries and sectors to seek 
similar enabling conditions and pursue similar strategies. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article avance que le succès soutenu des coopératives agricoles aux Pays-Bas peut se justifier 
par une combinaison de cinq facteurs. Premièrement, les Pays-Bas sont dotés d’une législation 
facilitante sur les coopératives. Deuxièmement, les coopératives des Pays-Bas parviennent à 
conserver un contrôle efficace de leurs membres par des innovations touchant la gouvernance 
interne. Troisièmement, l’hétérogénéité des membres a été contenue, en dépit de la croissance et de 
l’internationalisation des coopératives agricoles. Quatrièmement, les coopératives hollandaises ont 
été pragmatiques en établissant puis en démantelant leurs structures coopératives fédératives. 
Cinquièmement, les coopératives ont choisi des stratégies explicites en ce qui concerne leur position 
dans la chaîne alimentaire. Ce papier repose sur une revue de littérature scientifique et 
professionnelle. L’éclairage qu’offrent les expériences des coopératives agricoles hollandaises 
pourrait inciter les dirigeants de coopératives dans d’autres pays et secteurs à rechercher des 
conditions facilitantes analogues et à mettre en œuvre des stratégies semblables. 
Resumen 
El documento sostiene que el éxito continuo de las cooperativas agrícolas en los Países Bajos puede 
explicarse gracias a una combinación de cinco factores. Primero, los Países Bajos cuentan con 
legislación que propicia el cooperativismo. Segundo, las cooperativas de los Países Bajos han 
logrado mantener un control eficaz de sus miembros a través de innovaciones en materia de 
gobernanza interna. Tercero, la heterogeneidad de los miembros se ha mantenido en un nivel bajo, 
a pesar del crecimiento y de la internacionalización de las cooperativas agrícolas. Cuarto, las 
cooperativas holandesas han sido pragmáticas en el establecimiento y el desmantelamiento de 
estructuras cooperativas federativas. Quinto, las cooperativas seleccionaron estrategias explícitas 
respecto de su posición en la cadena alimenticia. El documento se basa en un análisis de la literatura 
académica y profesional. Las observaciones surgidas de las experiencias de las cooperativas 
agrícolas holandesas pueden inspirar a los líderes cooperativos de otros países y de otros sectores 
a buscar condiciones propicias similares y a seguir estrategias similares. 
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Introduction 
The biggest dilemma for a cooperative (…) is that change itself is bound to increase tensions among 
its members. There are two reasons for this. One is that change upsets established mechanisms for 
decision making and cooperation. The other is that change tends to cause preferences to diverge, 
which (…) is problematic for ownership. (Holstrom, 1999) 
The Netherlands has a rich tradition of cooperative development in agriculture. Over the years, 
cooperatives have been able to successfully adjust to changes in policies, market conditions and 
technologies. While new strategies have been developed for new markets and new product 
categories, cooperatives have remained remarkably stable in their market shares over the last 50 
years. From 2000 to 2010, Bijman (2012) showed even a slight increase of market share for all 
agricultural cooperatives as a whole. 
While the number of farmers has gradually declined over the last 50 years, agricultural production 
has remained stable. In 2015 only 60,000 farmers remained, while the total added value generated 
by agriculture, food processing and distribution continues to be 50 billion euro. Cooperatives take 
responsibility for a major share of this added value.  
Figure 1 shows the joint market share of all (marketing) cooperatives in the Netherlands, in 
comparison with other EU countries. While the EU average is 40%, the market share of the Dutch 
cooperatives is close to 70%. Table 1 shows the main agricultural sectors in which cooperatives play 
a dominant role: dairy, sugar and potatoes, animal breeding, fruit & vegetables and flowers. 
Figure 1. Market shares of agricultural cooperatives 
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Table 1. Key figures agricultural cooperatives (2015) 
 Number of  
Cooperatives 
Market Share 
(%; 2010) 
Members 
(only in NL) 
Employees 
(fte) 
Sugar 2 100 11000 2200 
Dairy (milk processing) 5 86 1600 21500 
Fruit & Vegetables 15 95 2500 2600 
Potato starch 1 100 2500 1300 
Seed and Ware Potatoes 6 N/A 1500 200 
Mushrooms 2 >80 210 230 
Flowers 2 95 4800 2900 
Pig breeding 1 85 1750 500 
Cattle breeding 1 85 25500 1300 
Animal feed 13 55 30000 6200 
Sources: Coöperatie, Vol. 77, No. 622, March 2015; market share: Bijman et al., 2012. 
 
 
While this paper focuses on cooperatives in agriculture, cooperatives also have a strong position in 
other sectors of the economy. In financial services, most companies are cooperatives. Rabobank is 
well known internationally, with almost 2 million members. Also, most insurance companies are 
cooperatively owned by over 15 million members (of a total population of 17 million). Although wind 
energy has a long tradition in the Netherlands, the last decade has seen a rapid increase in wind 
energy and solar energy cooperatives. Specifically, the reduced cost of solar panels, together with 
some subsidies from the state, has induced a rapid increase in the number of solar panels placed on 
roofs of individual houses or other buildings. Most of the owners of these houses are members of an 
energy cooperative (there are now approximately 220). Additionally, the number of entrepreneur 
cooperatives outside the agricultural sector has grown rapidly over the last decade. Many former 
employees who have been dismissed as a result of the economic crisis have started up their own 
businesses. The new entrepreneurs (by choice or need) have seen the benefits of working together 
in sharing facilities, purchasing materials and marketing their services. 
The objective of this paper is to present and discuss the key success factors of agricultural 
cooperatives in the Netherlands. The paper presents arguments and empirical findings from various 
academic and professional sources. As such, the paper can be considered a review of the literature. 
Based on the direct link between developments in the agricultural sector and the evolution of farmer-
owned cooperatives, the paper assumes that sustainably strong cooperatives have a positive impact 
on the prosperity of farming families and rural regions. 
The paper argues that the following factors affect the development of cooperatives in agriculture. 
First, the type of cooperative legislation influences the opportunities cooperatives have to adjust to 
changes in economic and political conditions. Second, effective member control continues to be a 
central characteristic of good cooperative governance, not only for managers to work in the interest 
of the members, but also to keep members committed to their cooperative. Third, the extent of 
member heterogeneity influences the efficiency of the decision-making process. Fourth, federative 
cooperative structures have a life cycle: they may be needed under certain market conditions but they 
may become redundant when conditions change. Fifth, cooperatives may hold different positions in 
the food chain, ranging from simple collective bargaining to marketing branded consumer products. 
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While the latter is not necessarily better than the former, choosing an explicit strategy helps 
cooperatives to manage internal operations and external strategies. 
Before discussing each of these five success factors in a separate section, we will first present a brief 
overview of the history of agricultural cooperatives in the Netherlands.  
History 
The history of agricultural cooperatives goes back to the mid 19th century, when more and more 
agricultural association were being established. These associations were engaged in farm insurance, 
cattle breeding, rural credit, and the exchange of farm knowledge. Most of these associations were 
organised rather informally and were often supported by local dignitaries. With the enactment of the 
first cooperative legislation in 1876, the first formal cooperatives were established, specifically in 
purchasing inputs and processing milk. It took another decade before cooperatives become quite 
popular, but a rapid increase in the number of newly established cooperatives can be found from the 
1890s on (Rommes, 2013). 
Interestingly, the number of associations grew parallel to the number of cooperatives, indicating that 
farmers (and their supporters, mainly the farmer unions) saw the benefit of establishing farmer-owned 
enterprises, but were not yet convinced that cooperatives were the ideal model (Rommes, 2013). This 
can be explained in part by the unfamiliarity of the new legal model, and in part by the reputation of 
cooperatives as a pure business model, while most supporters of cooperatives (farmer unions, priests, 
local dignitaries) also emphasized the community-element of joint organization and the need to invest 
any surplus in the community instead to paying it out to the members. It was only after 1920 that most 
associations turned into cooperatives and the cooperative model become dominant. 
Although the cooperative was primarily organized for economic purposes, the social element of 
collaboration and solidarity should not be underestimated. Farmers were used to helping one another 
in emergencies (neighbourly help) and deciding matters of common interest together (for example in 
the Water Boards). This idea of common interest was expressed in the names given to the cooperative 
dairies established at village level. Common names were Harmony (Eendracht), Concord 
(Concordia), and Our Interest (Ons Belang). Other evocative names that bear witness to a more social 
or even religious bent were Good Expectations (Goede Verwachting), Future (Toekomst), Hope 
(Hoop) and Aurora. 
The expansion of the world economy between 1890 and 1930 was favourable for Dutch agriculture, 
and thus for the founding of cooperatives. The Netherlands was neutral in World War I and agriculture 
benefitted from the large demand for agricultural products during and after the war. Similar to other 
European countries (Fernández, 2014), cooperatives in the Netherlands were particularly strong in 
those sectors focused on exports. For that reason, early cooperative development was mainly in the 
northern and western parts of the country, regions with a long history of commercial agriculture. In 
the poor southern and eastern regions, where there was mostly small-scale agriculture, cooperatives 
were developed as institutions for the emancipation of peasants, often supported by farmer unions, 
the Catholic church and local dignitaries. In sum, cooperatives played an important role in the 
transformation of semi-subsistence agriculture into commercial agriculture by supplying farm inputs 
and farm credit and organizing the selling and processing of farm products. 
  
Enabling Legislation 
The institutional environment in the Netherlands has always been favourable for the development of 
cooperatives. This can partly be explained from its historical and sociological background. The Dutch 
have a tradition of self-organization, democratic decision-making and coalition governments, often 
referred to as the ‘polder’ mentality. The long history of decentralized government and the need for 
self-organization in keeping one’s feet dry in the polder have supported the cooperative mentality. 
Other important sociological features of Dutch society are its high trust and liberal business attitude. 
Collaboration on the basis of shared-interest is a dominant characteristic of the farming industry. 
In the Netherlands, producers may choose any legal business form that suits their need for formal 
organization of collaboration. From the available menu of business forms, farmers can choose  
between cooperatives, associations, foundations, private companies limited by shares, public 
companies, or partnership-type businesses. The legal form most frequently used by farmers to set up 
a jointly-owned business is the cooperative. There is no state policy to induce farmers to choose 
cooperatives over other legal business forms. There is also no state support for the promotion of 
cooperatives, nor are cooperatives obliged to fund any joint support organization (e.g. for knowledge 
sharing, accountancy or advocacy). In line with this liberal perspective on business organization, 
cooperatives are under no obligation to adhere to additional social or civil society principles or to 
associate potential new members, unless the articles of association stipulate otherwise. The 
legislature does not actively promote the ICA principles. 
Evaluating the current legislation for cooperatives, in general, the Dutch laws on cooperatives and 
associations has been regarded by practitioners as very flexible with regard to setting up a 
cooperative and tailoring the cooperative’s articles of association to the needs of its incorporators 
(Van der Sangen, 2013). Cooperatives are easy to establish and maintain, in terms of money and 
time. Within a number of general rules on the internal governance structure of cooperatives, they are 
free to develop more detailed internal rules in their statutes, for instance regarding the type of 
activities, members’ financial contribution, the distribution of surplus, and the communication between 
the members and the cooperative. At the same time, the business organizational rules on the 
cooperative – which are directly linked to Dutch legislation on associations – provide enough flexibility 
to tailor internal governance to the needs of the members. While there are some tax benefits for 
cooperatives, particularly for small cooperatives to obtain corporate tax reduction, they are limited and 
have never been a reason for farmers to choose the cooperative form over any other business form.  
In general, compared to legislation in other EU countries, the Dutch laws on cooperatives has been 
called enabling, as it has few compulsory rules and allows significant flexibility in designing statutes 
of individual cooperatives (Bijman et al., 2012).  
Effective member control 
Good corporate governance in cooperatives, including effective member control, can never be taken 
for granted. One of the key issues in cooperative governance is the allocation of decision rights 
between boards of directors and professional management (Bijman et al., 2013). The board of 
directors, representing the membership, needs to maintain sufficient decision rights so as to control 
the strategic development of the organization. At the same time, professional management demands  
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room for entrepreneurship, both for being successful in competing in the market and for venturing into 
new strategic directions and attracting good quality managers. The key question then becomes how 
many decision rights the board of directors delegates to the professional managers. 
Especially for cooperatives pursuing growth strategies, board control over management is a very 
relevant issue. According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), one of the main functions 
of the board (as the principal) is to make sure the management (as the agent) makes decisions that 
are in the interest of the owners of the company. Insufficient monitoring and control provides room for 
decisions by managers that are not in the interest of the owners or, in the case of a cooperative, of 
the members. Fulton and Hueth (2009) have shown that the combination of high complexity in the 
cooperative firm with a heterogeneous membership leads to paralysis in the board and thus, to a de 
facto shift in decision-making power from the board to the managers. 
Where agency theory starts from the premise of conflicting interests and seeks solutions in designing 
mechanisms that align interests, stewardship theory (Muth and Donaldson, 1989) emphasizes the 
shared interests between the board and management in promoting organizational performance. Thus, 
from a practical point of view, the discussion is not just about organizing effective control, but also 
obtaining a good balance between control and empowerment of the managers. 
Boards of cooperatives may respond to the need for growth and strategic reorientation by delegating 
more decision rights to the managers, either within existing governance structures or within formally 
changed governance structures (Hendrikse, 2005). These new structures entail a transfer of decision 
rights from the board to professional management. Accommodating the world of farmers and the 
world of professional managers in one corporate governance structure is a challenging task that lies 
with the board of directors (Bijman et al., 2013). 
Cooperatives have shifted to another corporate governance model because of changes in the 
competitive environment. In order to develop appropriate strategic and tactic responses to competitive 
pressures, cooperatives have felt the need to strengthen the autonomy of their management, reduce 
member influence on operational decisions, find new sources of equity capital, and professionalize 
their supervisory bodies. In other words, their strategic re-orientation towards more customer focus, 
diversification, and innovation has been accompanied by changes in the decision-making structure. 
Agricultural cooperatives in the Netherlands are known to be flexible and innovative in their internal 
governance structures. Above, we saw that the Dutch laws on cooperatives allow for significant 
freedom in deciding internal structures. Within the possibilities offered by legal boundaries, Dutch 
cooperatives have found various ways to deal with their challenges of strengthening of member 
commitment, member control, managerial entrepreneurship and financial requirements. 
Bijman et al. (2013) found that over the last 20 years, most agricultural cooperatives in the 
Netherlands introduced a formal division of labour between the Board of Directors, which took 
responsibility for decision control (ratification and monitoring) and the professional management, 
which was responsible for decision management (initiation and implementation). This division of 
labour has been institutionalized in new internal governance models (or board models). Besides the 
traditional model, which has been around for more than 100 years and is common in many countries, 
the authors found two new corporate governance models: the management model and the corporation 
model. In the management model, the management of the cooperative firm is also the Board of  
  
Directors (BoD) of the cooperative society. In this model there is no longer a distinction between the 
decisions regarding the strategies and policies of the cooperative and the execution thereof. The BoD 
has been professionalized, and the supervisory committee supervises the society and the firm at the 
same time. In the corporation model, the BoD of the cooperative society has become the supervisory 
committee of the cooperative firm. A legal separation between association and firm has been 
established, turning the cooperative society into a 100% shareholder of the cooperative firm. This 
structure provides the management with relatively more autonomy. 
Another innovation in cooperative governance structures is related to the composition of the board of 
directors and the supervisory boards. The Netherlands allows a minority of non-member experts on 
these boards. In addition, large cooperatives have introduced a member council of 100 to 200 
members that has taken over most of the rights and obligations of the General Assembly. This 
member council is more likely to consist of committed members interested in the general affairs of the 
cooperative. Also, this member council is a pool for new board members. 
The Netherlands is not unique in these changes in internal governance. Bijman et al. (2014a) have 
shown that other European countries have also introduced several of these innovations. However, 
the Netherlands seems to be both the most innovative and the most advanced in introducing changes 
in the internal governance structure.  
Membership homogeneity 
It is often claimed that within large agricultural cooperatives, particularly marketing cooperatives, the 
heterogeneity of member interests is increasing (Cook, 1995). The growth of the cooperative firm 
through internationalization and diversification results in different groups of members having different 
interests. Also, members may become more diversified in their individual strategies as their farms 
specialize. This type of specialization is even furthered by the shift of (some) members from producers 
of commodities bound for spot markets to producers of specialized products for specific processor or 
retail customers. Membership heterogeneity poses a challenge for the farmer-owned cooperative 
(Hansmann, 1996). Decision-making may become more laborious, coordination between member 
firms and the cooperative firm may become more difficult, member commitment may decrease and 
member willingness to provide equity capital may be reduced. Membership heterogeneity affects the 
efficiency of the cooperative organization particularly through the influence cost problem. 
The influence costs problem is a major source of inefficiencies in agribusiness cooperatives (Cook, 
1995). Several crucial decisions entail the (re)distribution of wealth among the members of a 
cooperative and thus may provoke influence attempts by members. The allocation of overhead costs, 
the assessment of members’ product quality, and the geographical location of a new investment are 
but a few examples of such decisions (Hansmann, 1996). Iliopoulos and Hendrikse (2009) found, in 
a multiple case study, that influence costs are lower in cooperatives with a less heterogeneous 
membership. Membership heterogeneity (or homogeneity) was measured by the number of different 
crops the members delivered to the cooperative. Hendrikse and Bijman (2002) found that fruit and 
vegetables cooperatives that market multiple products, both for their members and other suppliers, 
are more likely to encounter higher influence costs. 
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Membership homogeneity has always been very high in the Netherlands. By comparison with other 
European countries, the Netherlands has a relatively large number of single purpose cooperatives 
(Van Bekkum et al., 1997). These are cooperatives with a specific field of operations, for example the 
supply of feed or the processing of only one crop, such as sugar beets. In other countries it is more 
common to find cooperatives that supply inputs and process and market the agricultural and 
horticulture products. The combination of many different tasks in so-called multipurpose cooperatives 
may lead to high influence costs. Other explanations for membership homogeneity are the cultural 
homogeneity (at least within the protestant and catholic sub-groups), the relatively small distances 
(thus allowing members to meet in person), and the low differentiation in farm size. One of the 
challenges for cooperatives to become transnational, that is, to obtain members in different countries, 
is the expected increase in membership heterogeneity and the concomitant decision-making 
problems. While the Netherlands is one of the European countries with the largest number of 
transnational cooperatives (Bijman et al., 2014b), most of these cooperatives are very focused on 
their product portfolio. The transnational cooperatives can be found in dairy (with milk as a very 
homogeneous product) and in fruits and vegetables, mostly for the same crop. 
Life cycle of (federative) cooperatives 
As of January 1, 2016, the last federative cooperative system in the Netherlands was abolished. At 
that date, the Rabobank changed from a system of 106 local banks, each of them being a member of 
the central cooperative, into a single cooperative with 106 local subsidiaries (Groeneveld, 2016). 
Cooperatives are mostly established as small organizations, which are often based in a particular 
community, neighbourhood or region. However, when growth opportunities exist, local cooperatives 
soon experience that for certain activities and bargaining situations, they need a larger scale. For 
these particular tasks, the most ‘natural’ procedure is to start collaborating with other local 
cooperatives and form federated cooperatives. Thus, federated agricultural cooperatives have been 
established for the joint purchasing of farm inputs, the joint marketing and export of dairy products, 
and jointly determining quality standards, standardized packages, and the collective promotion of 
fruits and vegetables.  
A federative organization is created in order to realize the common interests of its members without 
sacrificing their basic autonomy. Member organizations cooperate where necessary in order to remain 
independent where possible. This accounts for the material interests underlying the federative 
ideology. While many federated organizations exist for lobbying politicians and civil servants, on 
behalf of their member organizations, the interest of cooperatives is much more economic. Federated 
cooperatives are firms themselves, set up to gain economies of scale or to benefit from stronger 
bargaining power. 
According to the Danish cooperative expert Soegaard (1994), economies of scale (which include 
bargaining power and economies of scope) are the main rationale for the existence of federated 
cooperatives: 
To the extent that the duties of the central organization are economic, the formation of a 
federation is fundamentally attributable to economies of scale pertaining to the functions 
performed by the central organization. In the absence of such scale economies there would 
be no need for member organizations to form a common central organization. (Soegaard, 
1994: 107) 
  
 
Soegaard (1994) has argued that structural change is not only a matter of growth to exploit economies 
of scale, but also a matter of change in the distribution of inter-organizational power. He has described 
developments among federated organizations in Denmark, which suggest that there is a strong 
tendency for the balance of power in federative organizations to tilt in favour of the initially strongest 
member(s) of the organization. The strongest member(s) will use their power to bring about a 
restructuring towards a unitary organization. Soegaard describes three options for transitioning from 
a federated to a unitary organization: (1) the central organization acquires (or merges with) the 
member organizations; (2) the largest member organization takes over the central organization; and 
(3) several large member organizations take over parts of the activities/assets of the central 
organization, thus leading to several unitary organizations. The author concludes that due to the 
correlation between size and organizational power, federative organizations will be inherently 
unstable when political influence allows wide latitude in the distribution of the gains from cooperation 
in the federative organization, and the functions performed by the federative organization are so vital 
as to allow the central organization or the dominant member(s) to use their organizational power as 
a lever of structural change. 
Over the last decades, most federated cooperatives have been transformed into primary cooperatives 
or dismantled. For instance, for many years federated dairy cooperatives were exporting butter, 
condensed milk and cheese, on behalf of the member-cooperatives. In the 1960 and 1970s, many 
local cooperatives merged into regional cooperatives, which became large enough to organize 
exports themselves. This resulted in the termination of the federated cooperatives. Other examples 
can be found in the fresh produce industry. In 1996, with the merger of nine cooperative fresh produce 
auctions into the marketing cooperative The Greenery, the federated cooperative CBT was 
dismantled. The main task of the CBT (Central Bureau of the Fruit and Vegetables Auctions) used to 
be the harmonization of the conditions under which auctioning took place, thus promoting the 
transparency of the market and improving price determination. In addition, CBT carried out the 
collective promotion of Dutch fresh produce. In 2000/2001 the fruit and vegetables auction 
cooperative ZON was transformed from a federated into a primary cooperative. Finally, in 2000 in the 
feed industry, two major supply cooperatives, Cehave and Landbouwbelang, transitioned from 
federated cooperatives into a primary co-operatives and subsequently merged into the largest 
producer of compound feed in the Netherlands. 
The more heterogeneous the membership of a federated cooperative, the more difficult the decision-
making process is for strategic (such as investment) choices. Federated cooperatives may be able to 
deal with such heterogeneity as long as members are numerous and small, but it becomes a real  
problem when members become much larger than others (as measured by their ownership share or 
the volume of transaction with the federated cooperative). 
Choosing a strategic position in the food chain 
The traditional position farmer-owned cooperatives took in the food chain was closely related to the 
producers and rather distant from the consumers. This situation has changed fundamentally since the 
1990s. Cooperatives have copied the market strategies of (international) IOFs in the food industry. 
Those IOFs have always had a stronger focus on marketing branded products. Dutch cooperatives  
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have substantially increased their effort in product innovation and marketing branded products since 
the 1980s. 
Cooperatives have traditionally followed a cost leadership strategy, continuously aiming to improve 
the efficiency of their processing and sales operations. Members have always urged their 
cooperatives to keep operational costs as low as possible. Cooperatives were not able to influence 
the price, as they were price takers in competitive markets, or the prices were determined by EU 
market policies. This cost leadership strategy has led to many mergers among cooperatives when 
technological developments raised the minimum efficient scale of operation to a level beyond the size 
of one cooperative. These mergers have led to the small number of cooperatives that have survived 
(Table 1). Since the 1990s, this merger movement has extended into neighbouring countries (Bijman 
et al., 2014b). 
Besides a strategy of keeping costs as low as possible, marketing cooperatives have developed two 
other strategies to increase member income. The first strategy was to develop many different products 
on the basis of the same commodity. Dairy, starch potato and sugar cooperatives have all invested 
heavily in the development of new consumer and industrial products based on the ingredients of the 
commodity supplied by their members (milk, potatoes, sugar beets). 
The second strategy, followed mostly by cooperatives producing final consumer goods, was to 
develop their own brands. The main objective of this branding strategy was to strengthen the 
competitive position of the cooperative, both horizontally when competing with other food companies 
and vertically in competition with large food retailers (supermarkets). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, when branding became more important for food companies, cooperatives 
copied the strategies of well-established national and international food companies. In the dairy 
sector, Danone paved the way in branding and market segmentation in the 1990s, based on its 
experiences in selling water. Specifically, the large dairy cooperatives developed their own strong 
brands, both nationally (Friesche Vlag, Domo, Melkunie, Mona) and internationally. When Campina 
internationalized into Germany, it developed acquisition targets and strategic alliances among 
cooperatives that had well-established brands (like Sudmilch’s Landliebe, and MKW’s Tuffi and 
Fructis). 
Agricultural cooperatives in Europe perform well in many sectors and many stages of the food chain 
(Höhler and Kühl, 2014). Activities of cooperatives that are not directly related to the members’ 
product are mainly used for generating profit. The latter can then be paid out to the members or 
retained for investments. Operating at the most efficient scale of production often makes the 
cooperatives strong competitors for IOFs, which have to make a return on capital that is in line with 
the stock market expectations. Financing market-oriented strategies has not been a serious problem 
for most cooperatives in the Netherlands. 
Conclusion 
Agricultural cooperatives in The Netherlands have shown themselves to be resilient. They have a 
long history, going back to the enactment of the first cooperative law in 1876. After two decades of 
slowly gaining legitimacy, the cooperative has become the favourite model for farmer collective action, 
both in purchasing farm inputs and selling farm products. In the 20th century, Dutch agricultural  
  
cooperatives have benefitted from the market protection provided by the Common Agricultural 
Policies of the EU, but also from the gradual growth of the internal market in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s. After the major transformations in the EU’s agricultural policies, Dutch cooperatives continued 
to be successful businesses and strong member-based organizations.  
This paper claims that the continued success of Dutch agricultural cooperatives can be explained by 
a limited number of internal and external factors. The key external success factor has been the 
enabling legislation, which poses few but clear rules on how cooperatives should be structured and 
how they should operate. This legal framework has allowed for effective member control and, 
particularly, has provided room for innovations in internal governance in order to maintain and even 
strengthen member control in cooperatives that have grown into international companies with revenue 
in the billions. A success factor that has been mentioned often in the literature on cooperatives is 
membership homogeneity. The less heterogeneous the membership, the lower the influence cost 
problem and the more efficient the decision-making processes. While cooperatives experience the 
benefits of democratic decision-making (such as the higher commitment of stakeholders and fewer 
bad investment decisions), they need to keep heterogeneity as low as possible to maintain efficient 
decision-making.  
Another success factor relates to cooperation among cooperatives. Going back in history, we saw 
how many federative cooperative structures emerged. However, these federative cooperatives have 
been dismantled when local cooperatives became larger, advances in logistics reduced distances, 
and their position in local communities became weaker. Advances in technology and changes in 
market conditions no longer required federative structures. In conclusion, cooperatives in the 
Netherlands have acknowledged that federative structures have a life cycle, allowing for structural 
changes when market conditions change. Finally, cooperatives have been able to shift from cost 
leadership strategies when market conditions favoured large-scale production of uniform products to 
high value-added strategies when the competitive environment changed, particularly with the rise of 
supermarket companies and the shifting consumer demands towards higher quality, more variation 
and more convenience. 
Although this success story of Dutch agricultural cooperatives seems to be based on a unique 
combination of external and internal factors, there is no reason to believe why other countries or 
sectors should not be able to copy their success. Even applying one or two of the success factors 
described above would help other cooperatives in other countries or other sectors strengthen their 
competitive position. In sum, directors and managers of cooperatives, as well as policy makers, can 
learn from these success factors and seek to apply them to their own situation. 
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